This book provides a comprehensive study of asymmetric territorial conflict combining game theory, statistical empirical analysis and historiographic analysis. It proposes a model to explain the dynamics of territorial conflict between rivals with a wide disparity in capabilities between them. Using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a case study and testing the model on a database of almost four hundred territorial conflicts, Resnick argues that changes in 'patience' - explained by parallel evolutionary processes occurring in the respectively strong and weak societies - underlie the changing behaviour witnessed in such rivalries. Located within the general context of the interplay between material constraints and ideas, the theoretical significance of this model goes beyond the context of territorial conflict and can be seen to provide an explanation for the ideational aspects of power transitions and change in world politics.This book constitutes a significant advance in the literature on territorial conflict, which has increasingly come to be recognized as a key field of enquiry in the discipline of conflict studies and international relations scholarship in general.

This book provides a comprehensive study of asymmetric territorial conflict combining game theory, statistical empirical analysis and historiographic analysis. Using the Israeli-Palestine conflict as a case study, it tests the model on a database of almost four hundred territorial conflicts.